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Abstract 
Economics Honors Seminar 2007 
Premium Risk and Healthcare Policy 
Matthew Coffina' 
Oberlin College, B.A. 
In this paper, I analyze four alternative policies that address "premium risk": the risk that 
health insurance premiums will increase if an individual acquires a chronic condition. 
They are: premium risk insurance, community rating, anti-discrimination laws for large 
firms, and government subsidies. I show that community rating and anti-discrimination 
laws provide incomplete protection, and have the potential to create welfare-reducing 
distortions in incentives, while subsidies can be designed that mimic the efficiency of 
premium risk insurance. While the economic concepts behind these conclusions are 
well-documented and well-understood, I believe my own model adds value in the form of 
simplicity and ease of comparison. There is also an unambiguous policy implication: if 
we are concerned with premium risk, the complex legislation that has been introduced so 
far should be abandoned in favor of a new subsidy program. 
• Special thanks are owed to Professors Kenneth Kuttner and Barbara Craig for their helpful and insightful 
comments, as well as to Professors Cleeton, Craig, Fernandez, Gaudin, Kasper, and Kuttner for all that I 
have learned in four great years as an Oberlin Economics major. I thank Terri Pleska, all of my other 
professors at Oberlin, and my fellow Economics majors. Finally, my most profound gratitude is reserved 
for my parents, my sister, and for Stephanie. 
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1. Introduction 
In the last several decades, improvements in medical technology and public health 
have resulted in a new phenomenon: widespread, expensive chronic conditions. Whereas 
previously most healthcare treated acute conditions-after becoming ill, you were either 
cured, you died, or you suffered untreatable symptoms-chronic conditions that can 
require treatment for decades have become a much more important factor in determining 
expenditures on healthcare. According to the CDC!, more than 90 million Americans 
(nearly 30% of the population) have some form of chronic illness, and they account for 
more than 75% of the nation's total spending on medical care. 70% of U.S. deaths and 
33% ofunder-65 life-years-lost are attributed to chronic conditions. Some of the most 
common include cardiovascular disease, cancer, diabetes, Alzheimer's, hypertension, 
asthma, and arthritis. Other diseases, like AIDS, are becoming less like acute and more 
like chronic conditions all the time. 
With traditional health insurance contracts, which are renewed yearly, chronic 
conditions pose a particular risk: "premium risk,,2 is the risk that an individual' s health 
insurance premiums will increase if she acquires a chronic condition. For insurers to find 
their business worthwhile, they must charge a premium for insurance that is at least as 
great as their expected costs of paying for care. Since a person with a chronic condition 
generally has higher expected costs than the overall population, insurers will justifiably 
want to charge her higher premiums.3 If they were restricted to only charge her the same 
premium as healthy consumers, they would expect to lose money on her contract and 
1 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, (2005) "Chronic Disease Overview." 
http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/overview.htm. 
2 As far as I can tell, the phrase "premium risk" is attributable to Kifmann, Mathias (2002). 









would prefer not to insure her at all. Even worse, if they tried to charge healthy 
consumers higher than actuarially fair premiums, these consumers could be lured away 
by other insurers offering coverage at lower rates. Competition forces insurers to charge 
risk-rated, actuarially fair premiums if they wish to survive. Given the skewed 
distribution of health care expenditures, premium risk is potentially huge. In 1996, 1 % of 
Americans accounted for 27% of total healthcare spending, 5% accounted for 55% of 
spending, while the bottom 50% of the population accounted for only 3% of spending. 
Almost 54% ofthe top 1 % of spenders were under 65.4 
"Premium risk," interpreted in various ways, has drawn considerable attention 
from policymakers, especially during the Clinton administration. It was specifically 
addressed in Title 1 of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 
(HIP AA), which prohibited group insurance plans from charging a higher premium or 
denying coverage to a member of the group on the basis of health status, and limited 
exclusions for pre-existing conditions. 5 Many state legislatures have imposed similar 
restrictions on the individual insurance market, including guaranteed issue requirements: 
coverage cannot be denied on the basis of health status; and rate bands: restrictions on the 
variability of premiums. 6 Of course, guaranteed issue and rate bands must both be 
enforced for either to be effective, otherwise insurers could charge a low premium but 
deny coverage, or offer coverage only at an exorbitant premium. Similarly, regulations 
like these have begot the need for many other costly- and difficult-to-enforce rules. 
States have tried to monitor the way insurers market their products to prevent them from 
4 Berk and Monheit (2001). 
5 For more information on HIPAA, see the U.S. Department of Labor website at: 
http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/health-plans/, and at: http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/faqs/fa'Lhipaa_ND.html. 
6 For a comprehensive description of state regulations, see Kofrnan and Pollitz (2006). 
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purposefully targeting healthy clients and avoiding unhealthy ones. "Mandated benefits" 
endeavor to prevent insurers from differentiating policies by limiting coverage; for 
example, they may require plans to pay for diabetes supplies (46 states), Pap smears (27 
states), mammograms (50 states), or nurse practitioner services. Variation across states 
increases the cost of compliance. 
Although commentators on healthcare policy often emphasize three goals of 
insurance regulation: "affordability," "availability," and "adequacy;" from an economics 
perspective we can understand thes~ three goals to really be just one: affordability. There 
is no reason why insurers would not be willing to offer any reasonable amount of 
coverage-for the right price. Only when prices are restricted will insurers have an 
incentive to exclusively offer incomplete plans. Premium risk may be insurable, but only 
ex ante: before a chronic condition is revealed. After a chronic condition is known to 
exist, the idea of affordability becomes one of subsidy: anyone who thinks insurance 
premiums should not increase because a consumer acquired a chronic condition-
assuming that consumer had not purchased premium risk insurance when well-is saying 
that the consumer should be allowed to purchase insurance below cost. HIP AA and the 
state regulations try to accomplish this subsidization through price controls. A much 
more efficient means would be through an explicit subsidy. 
Both state and federal legislatures have implemented subsidy programs in various 
forms, although none of these is particularly effective. Subsidy programs-which tend to 
be small and under-funded, especially on the state level-target uninsured, low-income 
individuals with chronic conditions. The goal of eliminating premium risk is often mixed 
up with efforts to redistribute income and increase the number of Americans with 
4 
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insurance. As of 1999, "State High-Risk Pools"? had been set up in 28 states and 
provided insurance to 105,000 people, a tiny fraction of the already small individual 
insurance market. Pools are operated by state governments and provide insurance to 
qualified "uninsurable" consumers at subsidized prices. Despite the subsidization, most 
high-risk pools charge premiums that are considerably higher than average rates in the 
individual market, offer limited benefits, and have pre-existing condition exclusion 
periods. States have struggled to fund these pools, relying on general revenues, 
designated funds (such as taxes on tobacco products), and, most commonly, assessments 
on private insurers. This last source can have the perverse effect of exacerbating high 
prices in the individual market and distorting incentives. 8 
Several states sponsor reinsurance9 programs for the small-group and individual 
insurance markets. Reinsurance subsidizes insurers' highest-cost clients, although the 
amount of coverage varies widely depending on the state. As of 2004, insurers enrolled 
in Massachusetts' plan paid for an individual's claims up to $5,000 in a year, 10% 
coinsurance on the next $50,000, and nothing above $55,000. Insurers in Connecticut 
were covered for all claims above a $5,000 per person deductible. In New York, the state 
reinsurer covered 90% of annual claims between $5,000 and $75,000 per person. In 
some states, insurers are charged premiums that are large enough for the reinsurer to 
break even, while in others the reinsurance pool is subsidized with general revenue. Even 
in an unsubsidized pool, reinsurance acts as a tax transfer, shifting costs from unhealthy 
pools with high claims to healthy pools that pay excess premiums. Because enrolled 
7 See Achman and Chollet (2001). 
g For example, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) prohibits taxes on self-
insured employer plans, which places insured plans at a competitive disadvantage. 
9 See Chollet (2004). 
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insurers have less of an incentive to raise premiums if a client acquires a chronic 
condition, premium risk is transferred from the individual to the state. Reinsurance 
programs have several shortcomings, including variability across states, entrance 
requirements like low income and lack of insurance, and vulnerability to adverse 
selection when insurers choose which pools to enroll. 
Health Savings Accounts IO (HSAs) were established in 2003 and allow consumers 
to purchase private high-deductible health insurance with untaxed income, up to a 
maximum contribution of $2,600 for individuals or $5,150 for families. Qualified plans 
must have deductibles of at least $1,000 for an individual, $2,000 for a family, and out-
of-pocket maximums of$5,000 individual/$IO,OOO family. Before HSAs were 
introduced, there were several similar tax-advantaged accounts in place: Flexible 
Spending Accounts, Medical Savings Accounts, and Health Reimbursement 
Arrangements. Although the exact tax treatment, eligibility, allowable uses, and 
ownership of these accounts vary, they all share the same basic principle: extend the tax 
deduction given to employer-sponsored insurance to encourage uninsured consumers to 
purchase individual or small-group insurance on their own. Although HSAs may help 
chronically ill consumers pay for health insurance, they do almost nothing about the 
problem of premium risk. They provide no incentive for an insurer to not charge risk-
rated premiums. Although HSAs can be carried over across years, and earn interest tax-
free, the accounts are really too small to help a healthy consumer save up in case she 
eventually acquires a chronic condition. Even if the accounts were larger, saving is an 
inefficient way to deal with premium risk: consumers who remain healthy will have 
saved too much, while chronically ill consumers probably will not have been able to save 
10 See Kofman (2004). 
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enough. Another concern is that HSAs may increase risk segmentation as healthy 
consumers have an increased incentive to switch away from employer-based pools in 
favor of cheaper high-deductible plans. 
The United States is unique among developed nations in the way it pays for 
healthcare. In countries like Canada, the United Kingdom, Finland, and Australia, all 
citizens are obliged to have some form of health insurance. Since these "universal 
healthcare systems" are generally immune to adverse selection, community rating is 
enforced and premium risk is not a problem. A similar situation prevailed in the first 
two-thirds ofthe 20th century in the U.S., when a relative monopoly by Blue Cross 
allowed it to charge a single premium, regardless of health status. Competition, despite 
its many benefits, has made voluntary community rating unsustainable. 
As of2004, over 15% of the U.S. population, or nearly 46 million Americans, had 
no health insurance and had to pay for their care themselves (or receive charity care). 
About 27% of Americans had insurance coverage through public programs-most 
notably Medicare, which covers people over 65, those with disabilities, and anyone with 
end-stage renal failure (a chronic condition), and Medicaid, which is for low-income 
children, parents of dependent children, and the elderly (nursing home care). 
Government employees, the active-duty military, and veterans also receive government-
financed insurance or government-provided care (through the Veteran's Administration), 
and made up about 4% of the population in 2004. By far the most common source of 
insurance was employer-sponsored plans, which provided coverage to nearly 60% of the 
population. The main reason for the popUlarity of job-based insurance is that 
compensation in the form of insurance benefits, unlike wages, is tax-free to the employee. 
7 
Only about 6% of the population purchased their primary insurance directly in the 
individual market. Besides unfavorable tax treatment, the individual insurance market is 
disadvantaged by high administrative costs (caused by higher selling costs of policies) 
and a potentially severe adverse-selection problem.ll 
Because of the high proportion of Americans in either group or public insurance, 
where premiums are generally not risk-rated, it may seem that very few people are 
subject to premium risk. Note that, in the absence of regulation, any consumer outside of 
Medicare would be subject to premium risk: premiums in the individual and group 
market could be risk-rated, high-cost individuals could be excluded from plans, and 
Medicaid enrollees might be forced to transfer to other plans as their life situation 
changed. For the uninsured, the possibility of a chronic condition would add to the 
uncertainty of their medical expenses. Even with HIP AA, group plans are allowed to 
exclude treatments or diseases from coverage as long as the exclusion is applied 
uniformly to all employees. State regulation varies considerably depending on the state, 
and regulations of the individual market can often be circumvented. More importantly, 
even if state regulations and HIP AA were more complete, consistent, and worked 
together perfectly to eliminate premium risk, a much more efficient solution could be 
reached with a well-designed governrnent subsidy. 
The kind of subsidy advocated here is quite different from those discussed above. 
For a subsidy program to deal optimally with premium risk, it should be organized by the 
federal governrnent, so that all Americans can benefit and so that risk can be spread out 
11 Note that these percentages-from the U.S. Census Bureau's 2005 Current Population Survey-do not 
sum to lOO% because of double-counting when individuals had more than one kind of insurance during the 
year, which may lead to bias, especially in the number of uninsured Americans. See U.S. Department of 




across the largest possible pool. Beneficiaries should not be qualified by level of income 
or lack of insurance: there are surely more efficient ways to redistribute income, and 
higher-income taxpayers will be much more likely to support the plan if they stand to 
benefit from it directly. The program is almost assured to be redistributive anyway, since 
lower-income households tend to have more chronic conditions, and, depending on the 
financing mechanism, tend to pay less in taxes. The subsidy should be understood to be a 
kind of insurance, the same as premium risk insurance. Taxpayers are willing to pay for 
the government PRI because they know that, if they become chronically ill, they will be 
protected: the premium they pay for insurance will not increase net of the subsidy. 
Although the only explicit goal of this program is to eliminate premium risk, it is also 
likely to increase the number of Americans with insurance by decreasing adverse 
selection and allowing premiums to approach their actuarially fair level. The exact 
subsidy payout mechanism should be the one least susceptible to fraud or misuse, 
probably a fixed disease-specific payment directly to the insurer. 
In section 2, I review the literature on private premium risk insurance and the 
reasons it has not been widely adopted. In section 3, I introduce a model to explain and 
compare four alternative policies for dealing with premium risk: premium risk insurance, 
community rating, anti-discrimination laws in group policies (HIPAA), and a government 
subsidy. In section 4, I comment on the effects of changing some ofthe model's 
assumptions, combining different policy options, and related issues. Section 5 
summarizes my conclusions. 
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2. Premium Risk Insurance 
In an ideal world, premium risk would not exist. Insurers would offer a single 
insurance contract that would be agreed to by all consumers before birth, and would 
cover all of their lifetime healthcare expenses. Insurance companies would be committed 
to charging a predetermined sequence of premiums regardless of the health status of the 
consumer, and consumers would be obliged to pay those premiums. Since the full future 
path of premiums would be decided before any unknown health characteristics or chronic 
conditions were revealed, there would be no premium risk. 
There are many reasons a lifelong insurance policy is not possible. Insurance 
companies can go bankrupt, consumers can move away from their insurers, babies cannot 
sign contracts, and so on. The biggest obstacles, however, are time inconsistency and 
adverse selection. If an insurer agrees to a premium that turns out to be below its costs, 
for example if it is unlucky enough to end up with a pool of clients that have lots of high-
cost chronic conditions, it will have a strong incentive to renege on its commitment by 
canceling the policies or going out of business. Similarly, if a consumer agrees to 
premiums that are above her expected costs, for example because she ended up much 
healthier than average, she will want to stop paying her expensive premiums and switch 
to another insurer. If only unhealthy consumers remain in the original insurance pool, 
premiums will have to increase or the insurer will become insolvent. In order for lifelong 
insurance to work, healthy consumers must remain in insurance pools to subsidize the 
premiums of unhealthy consumers, even after their health states are revealed to them. 
Judicial attempts to enforce unfavorable contracts are likely to be ineffective and costly. 
10 
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For premium risk insurance to really be feasible, contracts must be designed that 
consumers willingly uphold. 
Pauly Kunreuther, Hirth (hereafter PKH) (1 995) and Cochrane (1995) have both 
derived "optimal" contracts that make premium risk insurance (PR!) possible. These 
papers share the same objective: to divide the lifetime insurance contract into a series of 
one-period contracts that will be purchased by both healthy and unhealthy consumers in 
all periods, and that allow insurers to break even. The idea is to make all consumers 
"pre-pay" higher future premiums before they are aware of who will actually end up with 
a chronic condition. If these contracts existed, they would represent an efficient, market-
based way to eliminate premium risk. There have been many explanations offered as to 
why they are rarely, if ever, seen in the u.s. 
PKH (1995) envision a "Guaranteed Renewable" (GR) insurance contract. 12 
Insured consumers are guaranteed the right to renew their insurance at the end of the 
contract term, and into the future, at a predetermined rate of premium growth. The 
premiums are structured such that low-cost consumers will choose to purchase insurance 
in all periods, the same premium is charged regardless of health status, and insurers break 
even. In PKH's model, total costs in the last period are paid in the first period, total costs 
in the second-to-last period are paid in the second period, and so on. In the early periods, 
premiums exceed annual costs. Healthy individuals are willing to buy insurance because 
it is actuarially fair, considering the risk that they will become unhealthy in the future. 
12 Insurance contracts claiming to be "guaranteed renewable" are actually quite common in the U.S., and 
GR protections are even mandated by most states and by HIPAA. However, a GR designation is usually 
deceptive in this case. The HIP AA rule does not restrict premium increases over time, or even require that 
premiums be the same for all individuals in a rating class. Stricter state regulations can often be bypassed 
by raising premiums for an entire GR pool and then reclassifying healthy consumers into new pools. For 
GR to be meaningful, it must specify a future rate of premium growth at the time of purchase. GR 
provisions that do not restrict premiums are more like "guaranteed issue" requirements, which are useless 
in isolation. 
11 
Premiums decline over time, so that by the last period, they have fallen to the one-period 
actuarially fair level for a healthy consumer. By contract, those consumers that become 
high-cost are guaranteed insurance at the same premium as the healthy consumers. If a 
low-cost consumer drops out of the insurance pool at any time, it will have no effect on 
the premium or the insurer's zero level of profits. If a high-cost consumer drops out, the 
insurer's profits will increase. Although the model predicts premiums that decrease over 
time, other factors, like age-related increases in risk over time, may make the observed 
premium sequence flat or increasing. Guaranteed renewability is implicit in large-group 
insurance policies under HIP AA. 
Rather than committing consumers to a particular insurer, Cochrane's (1995) 
contract requires a severance payment at the end of each period equal to the change in the 
present discounted value of a consumer's expected future costs. If a consumer becomes 
healthier, she makes a payment to her insurer, and if she becomes less healthy, she 
receives a payment. One-period insurance can then be offered in each period at the risk-
rated actuarially fair premium, and consumers can use their severance payments to pay 
for higher premiums if they acquire a chronic condition. The PRI need not be provided 
by the same company as the health insurance, or even by a health insurer. The cost of 
this "time-consistent" PRI is the same as in PKH: the actuarially fair premium, given the 
future severance payments a consumer has some probability of receiving or paying. 
Cochrane expects that these severance payments will be kept in a special account created 
for that purpose, so that the consumer need only pay a fixed amount into the account 
every period, and severance payments are received or paid automatically. 
12 
Problems have been demonstrated with both kinds ofPRI contract, especially by 
the authors themselves. Neither contract can do anything for consumers who start out 
with a chronic condition before any PRI contracts are available. Similarly, PRI will not 
help consumers with a congenital predisposition to illness. PRI premiums must be 
adjusted for initial differences in expected costs or these contracts will be no more viable 
than standard community-rated insurance. There may be limited demand for PRI if 
consumers systematically underestimate their own probability of illness because of 
cognitive bias. Although an individual with a chronic condition may be highly aware of 
chronic care issues, healthy young people are probably oblivious to the risks they face. 
Moral hazard may be an issue if consumers with PRI are less likely to make lifestyle 
changes, like losing weight or quitting smoking, that could decrease their risk of a 
chronic condition in the future. PRI could be subject to adverse selection if consumers 
have private information about their own health state before they purchase PRI. Perhaps 
most importantly, the existence of alternative policies like anti-discrimination laws and 
rate bands limit (or at least are perceived to limit) the premium risk consumers face, and 
make them less likely to purchase PRI. 
There are other problems specific to either PKH's (1995) or Cochrane's (1995) 
contract. Guaranteed renewability suffers from lock-in. Insurers are committed to 
provide a predetermined level of coverage at a single price to both high- and low-cost 
consumers. Those consumers that turn out to be high-cost are essentially bound to the 
insurer because they have already pre-paid premiums. If they switched to another 
insurer, they would be charged a risk-rated premium. This reduces competition and 
consumer choice. It is problematic if a consumer wishes to change insurers for any 
13 
reason, such as relocation or a change of employer. Insurance companies have an 
incentive to exploit lock-in by raising premiums for an entire pool (if the policy allows 
for some flexibility in pricing), or by skimping on quality (e.g. by reinterpreting the 
coverages or limiting the network of care providers). This behavior may be limited by a 
careful drafting of the insurance contract, although any such commitment will be time-
inconsistent, and perhaps unenforceable. 
The supply of GR coverage will be limited by intertemporal risks that cannot be 
diversified. 13 By committing to a future level of coverage, the insurer exposes itself to 
the risk of medical inflation or expensive new technology. Unlike the interpersonal risk 
of illness (except in the case of epidemics), this kind of risk cannot be pooled. Medical 
inflation will affect all insured individuals in the same way. Insurers may have different 
estimates of probable future costs. Firms with low estimates-especially ifthey are 
highly constrained with respect to the premiums they can charge or the coverage they 
must offer-may risk bankruptcy. If an insurer goes out of business for any reason, high-
cost clients will have pre-paid premiums for no reason. There is an incentive for insurers 
to collect excess PRI premiums and then immediately drop out of the insurance market. 
The need to fix coverages ahead of time makes it difficult to adapt to new medical 
technology. 
Frick (1998) provides another reason that guaranteed-renewable contracts may 
not be possible: consumer capital market constraints. The PKH model assumes perfect 
capital markets, no consumer discounting, and zero interest rates. Frick's model 
eliminates consumer's ability to borrow to pay high initial premiums, and assumes zero 
interest rates and positive consumer discounting, observing that full GR protections will 
13 See Cutler (1993). 
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never be purchased in this case (the discount rate acts as a tax on pre-paid premiums). 
For consumers with relatively low discount factors-high discount rates, i.e. "impatient" 
consumers-guaranteed-renewability may not be purchased at all. 14 
Cochrane's PRJ does not result in insurer lock-in. Cross-subsidization through 
severance payments equalizes consumers' net expected future expenses at the end of 
every period. Special PRJ accounts are attached to consumers, so they are free to change 
insurers at the end of any period. There is less concern that an insurer will go bankrupt 
because of the reduced time frame. Insurers can always readjust premiums to one-period 
actuarially fair levels, so medical inflation can be incorporated over time. Ex post 
bilateral severance payments mean that PRJ premiums can remain level over time, 
eliminating the need for excessive or impossible borrowing to pre-pay premiums. 
On the other hand, Pauly, Nickel, Kunreuther (1998) show that the existence of 
Medicare, which puts a time limit on future cost risk resulting from a chronic condition, 
can cause level-premium PRI to unravel. Cochrane's contract (as well as the subsidy 
system I propose) requires that changes in expected healthcare expenses be measurable, 
which is not necessary with guaranteed renewability. Of course, changes in expected 
expenses should be observable through changes in premiums. Ifpremiums do not 
change, no PRI benefits need be paid. Trouble may arise in estimating changes in future 
expected expenses (to determine the appropriate severance payment), although Cochrane 
believes a reasonable approximation could be found. Perhaps a more serious problem is 
that the information contained in premiums may be obscured if a consumer switches her 
14 Herring and Pauly (2006b) use an empirical simulation to determine an optimal path ofGR premiums 
that increases with age and approximates observed premium schedules in the individual market. This 
finding implies that Frick's critique may not be relevant, and even that GR contracts exist and are effective 
in the individual market. 
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insurance plan to one with a different level or quality of coverage. PRI should only 
reimburse changes in premiums for the same contract, not changes in preferences toward 
higher or lower quality insurance. Similarly, changes in premiums resulting from 
medical inflation must be separated from those caused by changes in health status. 
It is possible that PRJ contracts have simply not had sufficient time to evolve, 
given the relatively recent appearance of widespread, expensive chronic conditions. 
Cochrane's PRI in particular would require radical change from currently offered health 
insurance contracts, including a complicated new system of severance payments, the 
creation of special PRI accounts, and institutions to assure fairness and prevent fraud. 
Insurance companies may be loath to introduce the new contracts because of fear of 
future regulation, for example rules aimed at preventing them from fully risk-rating 
premiums, and because of the risk that courts will not enforce PRI contracts, especially 
politically-sensitive provisions like consumers making severance payments to insurers 
when they become healthier. 
3. Model 
I consider a two-period model. At the beginning of period 1, all consumers are 
assumed to be identical, and none has a chronic condition. I assume there is only one 
chronic condition and all consumers have a probability p of acquiring the condition 
during period 1. I assume 1 > p > O. "Healthy" consumers (i.e. those without the 
chronic condition) have healthcare costs s, where s is a continuous random variable that 
takes on a value in the range 0 ~ s < 00 according to the probability density function 
16 
ct) 
f(e) . The expectation of health care costs for a healthy consumer is rno = fe f(e)de . I 
o 
assume the insurance market is competitive and there are no administrative costs: 
premiums are actuarially fair, and for a healthy consumer the premium is rno' On 
average, a portion p of consumers will be "unhealthy" (i.e. they have the chronic 
condition) in period 2. Unhealthy consumers have healthcare costs Jl , a continuous 
random variable that occurs in the range 0 $; Jl < 00 according to the probability density 
ct) 
function g(Jl). The expectation of Jl is rn1 = f Jl g(Jl )dJl where rn1 > rno. The 
o 
presence of a chronic condition can affect the uncertainty of healthcare costs as well as 
the expected value of those costs. Since what we are really interested in is premium risk, 
and insurers are assumed to be risk-neutral, the difference between expected costs of 
"healthy" and "unhealthy" consumers is the only relevant effect. IS 
1 Series of Events: 
Purchase insurance for period 1 
Purchase premium risk insurance? 
t 
Reveal chronic condition 
Purchase insurance for period 2? 
Switch employers? 
Collect subsidy? 
Period 1 t Period 2 
15 Note that this is also the reason I distinguish between "high-cost" and "low-cost" consumers, rather than 
using the more common terminology "high-risk" and "low-risk." 
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I assume utility is a function of wealth left over after paying healthcare costs and 
insurance premiums, U(w - & / f-l) without insurance or U(w- mOil) with insurance (the 
slashes denote an either/or choice), and that consumers are Bernoulli expected-utility 
maximizers. Consumers begin each period with w in endowed wealth, and wealth is not 
transferable between periods. 16 I assume consumers are risk-averse, resulting from 
(positive) diminishing marginal utility of wealth: U' > 0 and V" < O. Absent moral 
hazard, consumers will always prefer a fixed loss (the actuarially fair insurance premium) 
to an uncertain loss of the same expected magnitude. Consumers are assumed to discount 
period 2 outcomes by a factor O. I assume that insurers and consumers have the exact 
same perfect information about a consumer's health state with respect to the chronic 
condition. I consider five policy alternatives: A. do nothing (insurance is offered in each 
period at the risk-rated actuarially fair premium); B. there is premium risk insurance ala 
Cochrane (1995) or PKH (1995); C. there is government-enforced community rating in 
both periods; D. there are large-firm employers with implicit guaranteed renewability 
16 See "Note 1: Savings" in the next section. 
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(e.g. because of HIP AA); E. there are transfer payments to the chronically ill. In section 
4, I comment on the effects of adding savings, moral hazard, ex ante heterogeneity, 
additional periods, administrative costs, or endogenous changes in income to the model. 
I also discuss combining policies (C) and (D), which would be most similar to actual 
policy, the possibility of PRJ despite the existence of policies (C), (D), or (E), and 
potential concerns about the subsidy system. 
A. Do Nothing 
This is the simplest scenario. Premiums in each period are equal to a consumer' s 
expected loss, conditional on her health state. Consumers purchase insurance in all 
periods because they are risk-averse and insurance is actuarially fair. The first period 
premium is just mo for all consumers. The second period premium is rno for the 1- p 
consumers who don't acquire the chronic condition, and is m1 for the p consumers who 
dO. I7 Before health states are revealed, expected utility for the representative consumer 
IS: 
(1) 
B. Premium Risk Insurance 
As in PKH (1995), premium risk insurance requires that the premium schedule 
match the cost schedule in reverse chronological order, so the last period is financed first. 
This allows insurers to charge premiums that are no higher than what consumers will 
consider actuarially fair (with respect to the entire time frame) in all periods. Average 
17 For a graphical analysis of this scenario, and the utility loss from premium risk, see Figure 1 in the 
Appendix. 
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healthcare costs in period 2 are P m l + (1 - p )ma. Insurers earn interest on unspent 
premiums at a rate r , so the excess costs of unhealthy consumers in period 2 require 
excess premiums in period 1 of p(m l - ma). In Cochrane's (1995) conception, this 
1+r 
excess premium will be used to finance a severance payment of ml - mo to the 
"unhealthy" portion p of consumers at the end of period 1, which they can then use to 
purchase insurance at the actuarially fair premium mI. In PKH's (1995) conception, the 
excess premium allows the insurer to charge a premium ma to all consumers in period 2, 
which is actuarially favorable to unhealthy consumers, and actuarially fair to healthy 
consumers. Either mechanism produces ex ante expected utility of: 
(2) 
An uncertain loss in period 2 has been converted into a certain loss in period 1. 
Compared to the scenario in (A), consumers are made better offby purchasing PRl if: 
If inequality (3) does not hold, no one will buy premium risk insurance, so consumers 
cannot be made worse off by its availability. In this case consumers would choose to 
"self-insure," and expected utility would be the same as in (A). Inequality (3) shows that 
for consumers to demand PRI, the utility foregone in period 1 to pay the extra premium 
(the left-hand side) must not outweigh the increase in discounted expected utility in 
period 2 (the right-hand side). Rearranging terms, we have: 
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Taking the derivative of the left-hand side of (4) with respect to r and 8 , we can 
verify that premium risk insurance becomes more attractive with increasing r and 
increasing 8 : 
(5) 
(6) 
Higher interest rates allow insurance companies to charge lower excess premiums, and 
less discounting (8 closer to 1) means consumers are more concerned about the risks 
they face in period 2. Both of these factors make PRJ more desirable. 
PKH (1995) assume zero interest rates and no discounting, r = 0 and 8 = 1 . 
Cochrane (1995) makes the more general assumption 8 = _1_. Using Cochrane's value 
1+ r 
for 8, making the simplifying substitutions w - ma = W I and ml - ma = x, and 
rearranging terms, inequality (3) becomes: 
(7) 
Inequality (7) is, of course, always true for a risk-averse consumer: it is just the standard 
preference for a fixed loss over an uncertain loss of the same expected magnitude. 
However, note that if 8 < _1_, consumers will not necessarily choose to purchase PRI. 
1+r 
As per Frick (1998), if consumers have sufficiently high discounting (relative to the 
interest rate) 18 they will not find it worthwhile to sacrifice current consumption to 
18 Note that Frick (1998) actually assumes a zero interest rate but positive discounting, which seems 
unrealistic. 
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eliminate a future risk. Given r , the particular range of 8 over which (3) will hold will 
depend on the degree of risk aversion (the shape of the utility curve). 19 
C. Community Rating20 
In this scenario, the government requires that an insurer charge the same premium 
to all consumers in an age- or geographical-based group regardless of health status. 
While strict community rating is rarely seen in the U.S., partial community rating is a 
common feature of state insurance regulations?! Where community rating is enforced, 
insurance companies can often find ways around it, for example by offering plans with 
less complete coverage that attract healthier consumers or through targeted advertising. 
In the extreme case that risk groups can be completely segregated into different plans, the 
results will be the same as in (A): a "separating equilibrium." I model the opposite 
extreme: insurers can charge only one premium and must accept anyone who demands 
insurance at that price. 
Under community rating, the actuarially fair premium in period 1 remains rno' 
and all consumers purchase insurance. If both healthy and unhealthy consumers remain 
in the pool in period 2, insurers will charge the break-even premium rno + p(rn] - rno) ' 
This premium is actuarially favorable to the unhealthy consumers, so they will definitely 
purchase insurance. It is actuarially unfavorable to healthy consumers, who have 
expected costs mo. Since I am assuming that no other insurer can lure the healthy 
consumers away with a lower premium-it would not be able to keep out the unhealthy 
19 For a graphical analysis, see Figure 2 in the Appendix. 
20 Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) first observed the adverse selection results of parts (C) and (D). 
21 See Kofman and Pollitz (2006) or Achman and Chollet (2001). 
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consumers-the healthy consumers face a tradeoff. They can either bear the full risk of 
their uncertain healthcare costs, 8 , or they can pay the excess premium p(m1 - mo) for 
insurance. If the former happens, insurers are left with Akerlof's (1970) "lemon's 
market", and premiums must increase to mI ' Expected utility is then given by: 
00 
U[w-mal+(1- p)8 JU[W - 8l!(8)d8+ p8U[w - m1 ] . (8) 
o 
If unhealthy consumers remain in the insurance pool, expected utility is: 
(9) 
Comparing (9) with (1), we see that consumers are made unambiguously better off under 
community rating compared to the "do nothing" outcome in (A) if unhealthy consumers 
remain in the insurance pool. The comparison is analogous to (7): 
(10) 
Community rating may even be better than the optimal contracts of (B) if 8 < _1_ , since 
l+r 
the cross-subsidization occurs in period 2 rather than period 1. 
Comparing (8) to (1), we can readily see that consumers are made unambiguously 
worse off under community rating if the healthy consumers drop out of the pool.22 The 
unhealthy consumers end up in exactly the same predicament as in (A)-paying m1 for 
insurance-while the healthy consumers have to bear their own cost risk. The 
assumption of risk aversion ensures that: 
22 Whether community rating actually results in adverse selection is a somewhat disputed empirical 
question. Herring and Pauly (2006a) find some evidence of selection: higher premiums and a larger portion 
of uninsured consumers in community-rated individual markets as compared to unregulated markets, 
although the differences are relatively small in both cases. 
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ex) 
U[w - mol > ju[w - eV(e )de. (11) 
o 
Although (9) is strictly preferable to (8) ex ante, healthy consumers decide 
whether to remain in the insurance pool after their health state is revealed to them. They 
will continue to purchase insurance only if: 
'" u[w - mo - p(m} - mo)] > ju[w - eV(e )de . (1 2) 
o 
The definite reduction in utility from paying the excess premium p(m} - mo) must not 
exceed the average loss in utility from bearing the risk of e?3 The value of the right-
hand side of (12) will depend on the distribution of e (the probability density function 
f) and the degree of risk aversion. The greater the difference m} -:- mo' and the more 
unhealthy consumers there are (larger p), the less likely it is that a healthy consumer will 
be willing to subsidize the unhealthy consumers' premiums. 
D. Large-Firm Employeri4 
The HIP AA legislation prohibits employers from denying coverage or charging a 
different premium to an employee on the basis of health state. For a large firm, this 
restriction amounts to implicit guaranteed renewability for current employees, and a kind 
of safety net for unhealthy individuals who may seek a job at the firm for the sake of low-
cost insurance. HIP AA restrictions are less effective in a small firm where the premiums 
of all employees may increase significantly, or the firm may drop coverage altogether, if 
there is even one employee with a chronic condition. I assume that the only way a 
23 See Figure 3 in the Appendix. 




healthy employee in a large firm can avoid subsidizing the premiums of unhealthy 
employees is by leaving the firm: if an employee could just drop out of the insurance pool 
the situation would be the same as in (C). I also assume that firms have no way to 
discriminate against unhealthy job applicants. 
I introduce some ex ante heterogeneity in consumers. All consumers are either 
self-employed or employed with a large firm.25 I assume 7r ofthem work for the large 
firm and the other 1 - 7r are self-employed, where 1 > 7r > O. If self-employed, a 
consumer can only purchase insurance at the risk-rated actuarially fair premium; 
premium risk insurance is assumed to be infeasible. If employed with the large firm, 
insurance must be purchased at average cost for the group. The initial allocation of 
consumers to employers is assumed to be optimal,26 and every consumer faces a cost C j 
of switching, which may be different for different consumers. The subscript" i " indexes 
the set of consumers. 
Utility in period 1 is the same for both groups: U[w - ma ]. If there is no 
switching between employers, premiums in period 2 are ma + P (m l - ma) for large-firm 
employees, ma for the healthy self-employed, and ml for the unhealthy self-employed. 
We can simplify the notation by substituting w - ma = WI and mj - ma = X?7 Ex ante, 
25 I assume there is only one large firm. If there were many large firms with heterogeneous employee 
pools, inefficient switching/selection may occur between large firms as well. 
26 This assumption implies that, ignoring health insurance considerations, no one could be made better off 
by switching employers, which is the same as asserting C j > 0 for all i. There may be instances when a 
consumer would prefer to switch employers for reasons other than lower insurance premiums. In this case, 
the link between the employer and health insurance could result injob lock for people with chronic 
conditions, especially in the absence of "portability" regulation like HIPAA Title I. See Stroupe, Kinney, 
Kniesner (2001). 
27 This simplification is useful in this section because of the other complications involved. It could be 
made in any other section, although I believe it would detract from the main points. 
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employees of the large firm are obviously better off than the self-employed since they 
have implicit premium risk insurance: 
(13) 
Total utility is: 
U[w1]+ n-JU[WI - px]+ (1 - n-)J(PU[wl -x]+(l- p)u[wlD, (1 4) 
which is better than the outcome in (A) but not as good as (B) since only n- consumers 
have the GR protection. 
Individuals can still switch employers after their health states are revealed but 
before period 2 premiums are paid. Unhealthy self-employed consumers have an 
incentive to join a large firm (I will call this "type 1 switching"), and healthy large-firm 
employees have an incentive to become self-employed (type 2 switching). Initially, type 
1 switching will be done by consumers for whom: 
U[WI - px]- ci > U[WI - x], (1 5) 
and type 2 switching by consumers for whom: 
U[W1]-C i > U[WI - px]. (16) 
The employees with the lowest costs of switching are, of course, the most likely 
to switch. If any consumers switch though, selection will begin to playa role. The self-
employed population will become relatively healthy, while the large firm will have a 
disproportionate number of high-cost workers. The more the healthy and unhealthy 
consumers become segregated, the higher the premium in the large firm and the more 
unattractive this firm is for all consumers. Let SI equal the proportion of unhealthy 
consumers who have switched from being self-employed to a large firm-initially those 
that satisfy (15). Let S2 equal the analogous proportion of healthy consumers who have 
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switched from a large firm to being self-employed. The break-even (excess) premium in 
the large firm is then: 
(}x - rcp+p(l-rc)SI x 
- rc(I-S2 (1- p))+ p(l-rc)SI . 
Note that if SI = S2 = 0 we return to the large-firm premium without switching, 
ex = p x. We can confirm that e is increasing in SI and S2 for 0 < SI < 1 and 
0 < S2 < 1: 
ae rc (1- p )(rc p + (1- rc )SI p) 0 
aS2 = (rc(I-S2 (l-p))+(I-rc)SIPY > . 
The more general forms of (15) and (16) are: 
III Movement a/workers 
Large Firm 
Initial workers: n 
Healthy: 11: (l-p) 
Unhealthy: 11: p 
Self-Employed 
Healthy: (l-n)(1-p) 




28 This is just the number of unhealthy workers who end up in the large firm divided by the total number of 
workers in that firm (which is reduced by S2 and increased by S,), times the excess costs of unhealthy over 
healthy consumers. 
29 This simplifies to: 
,. p+(l-,.)S, P . () 
--;-_-.:...,--------O.---,-,--~-'....::.....-,--_ > 0 1- S2 1- P > P ; 1> S2 ' 
,.(1 -S2 (1- p))+(l-,.)S, p , 
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As consumers switch employers, the premium in the large firm increases, altering the 
tradeoff other consumers face when considering a switch. As S2 -+ 1, f) -+ 1 and (21) is 
more likely to hold; the more healthy workers leave the large firm, the greater the 
incentive for other healthy workers to do the same, even those with higher costs of 
switching. On the other hand, (20) is less likely to be true; only unhealthy workers with 
very low switching costs will seek to join the large firm since the premium is nearly the 
same as the risk-rated premium they pay in the individual market. Total utility is: 
(22) 
where C is the average switching cost incurred, L is the total number of consumers who 
end up in the large firm, NL is the number of unhealthy large-firm employees, Ns is the 
number of unhealthy self-employed consumers, and H s is the number of healthy self-
employed consumers. 
Taking derivatives of (22), ignoring C, we observe that both kinds of switching 
involve a tradeoff. There is a benefit to the consumer who switches but there is a 
disutility to all other employees of the large firm, whose premiums increase: 
a~l ~o PV-"{ u[ w - i x] -U[w-x]+uf w - ~L x]( ~L -+) > 0 
a~2 ~ o " (l - pl(U[w]-u[ W<L + Nl xufw-~L x]) <0 
Type 1 switching, where unhealthy self-employed consumers join the large firm, 
increases social utility on the margin: it moves us closer to a "pooling equilibrium." 





Type 2 switching is utility-reducing on the margin: it moves us closer to a "separating 
equilibrium." Utility is maximized when S} = 1 and S2 = 0, in which case total utility is: 
U[W11+O((P(1 - 1l')+1l')U!W1 - p X]+(1-P)(1 - 1l')U[w1 ]1 . (25) L 1l'(1-p)+p ) 
This is not as good as the community-rating outcome in (C) when healthy consumers did 
not drop out of the pool-or the result in (B) assuming 0 ~ _l---even without 
l+r 
including average switching costs. Pooling is incomplete: the outcome is between the 
pure "separating" and "pooling" equilibriums. All of the original large-firm employees, 
and all unhealthy consumers, end up working for the large firm. They pay a premium 
P x, which is larger than the premium in (9)31 because healthy consumers 
1l'(1- p)+ P 
who started out self-employed stay that way, and do not contribute to subsidizing the 
premiums of unhealthy consumers. Note that S} and S2 are not exogenously 
determined. As more switching occurs, type 1 switching becomes less likely and type 2 
switching becomes more likely, which only increases the probability that the end result 
will be considerably worse than the ideal large-firm scenario in (25). 
E. Government SubSidy 
lfthe market-based premium risk insurance contracts of (B) are not feasible, the 
best policy alternative is a government-enforced transfer of wealth from healthy to 
31 P x>px; 1l' (1 - p)+p <l ;1l'< l 
1l'(1 - p) + p 
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unhealthy consumers.32 If well designed, such a subsidy could produce the same 
outcome as with the market-based optimal contracts, while avoiding the potential 
selection and labor market distortion problems of (C) and (D). Assume there is a total net 
transfer of t that occurs in period 2. Healthy individuals each pay _t - and unhealthy 
1- p 
consumers each receive ~. Both groups purchase full insurance in all periods at the 
p 
risk-rated premium. Expected utility is: 
Maximizing (26) with respect to t, we can verify that the optimal transfer equalizes 
wealth across states of the world; there should be a payment of (1 - p )(m\ - ma) to 
unhealthy consumers funded by a tax of p (m1 - mo) on healthy consumers: 




Exactly as in (B), the premium risk has been eliminated: the loss is certain in all periods. 
In period 1 it is mo and in period 2 it is ma + P (m\ - mo) ' Since the government has the 
ability to finance the subsidy in any period, it is unconstrained by interest rate or 
discounting considerations. Consumers are made unambiguously better off compared to 
the situation in (A). 
32 van de Ven, et al. (2000) reach the same conclusion. Although their approach and perspective are quite 
different from my own, their empirical simulations generally confIrm the fIndings here. 
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4. Model Notes 
Note 1: Savings 
Depending on the interest rate, consumers can be made better off in all scenarios 
if they are allowed to save and borrow. In (B), PRI's entire excess premium has to be 
financed in period 1 to ensure that healthy consumers contribute. In (A), unhealthy 
consumers can only pay their higher premiums in period 2. Welfare would be improved 
if individuals could smooth their consumption over time. Assume consumers can carry 
net savings of y between the two periods at the same interest rate insurance companies 
earn, r. If consumers have a total expense P that occurs in period 1, as with premium 
risk insurance, utility is: 
U[w - P--L] +8U[w+ y]. 
1+r 
Optimal savings requires that: 
~ = __ 1_U'[w_ P _ -L] + 8 U'[w+ y] = 0 
By 1+r. 1+r 
uf w-p-6] = 8(I+r) 
U'[w+ y] 
The ratio of marginal utility in the first period to that in the second period must be 




8 = _ 1_, marginal utilities should be equated in the two periods, which means· the level 
1+r 
. P(1 + r) 
of consumptIon should be the same: consumers should borrow from the second 
2+r 
period to pay for half of their excess premium in the first period. In this case, it is quite 
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irrelevant when a loss occurs; consumers will always distribute it evenly between 
periods. Combining this result with the one in (E)-that wealth evenly distributed 
between states of the world is optimal-we can readily see that the premium risk 
insurance of (B) and the subsidy of (E) might both represent optimal policies. Since 
capital markets may be constrained-consumers may not be able to borrow at r , it is 
possible that 8 *- _1 ___ PRI will not always be optimal depending on our assumptions. 
l+r 
Since the government can collect taxes in any period, and borrow at the market-lowest 
interest rate, the subsidy system will always be optimal.33 
If we allow savings in scenario (A), utility is: 
u[w - mo _ _ r_] + (1 - p)8U[w-mo + r]+ p 8U[w - m1 + rl l+r 
(32) 
Assuming 8 = _1_, savings are optimal when: 
l+r 
u'[w - mo -~] = (1 - p)U'[w-mo + r]+ pU'[w - m1 +y], l+r 




ante expected utility is improved, healthy consumers will inevitably have saved too much 
and unhealthy consumers too little.34 In my model, subsidizing savings through a tax 
33 Insurers may be able to earn an interest rate that is higher than what the government could earn, for 
example because they are allowed to invest in equities. I assume the government could either borrow and 
subsidize the (mandatory) purchase of private PRI in period 1, or else the government is unconstrained in 
its investing. 
34 If consumers had known what their health states would be, they would have equated consumption in the 




deduction (e.g. with health savings accounts) would increase the amount of saving. 
Financing the deduction with a fixed levy on all consumers, however, would reduce 
efficiency: all consumers would save more, while incomes would be reduced dollar-for-
dollar with the tax benefit. Distorted incentives would result in too much saving by all 
parties: savings were already optimal without the tax incentive. Ifthe deduction were 
financed by a tax only on healthy consumers, the result would be the same as in (E): 
forced premium risk insurance. Healthy consumers would subsidize unhealthy 
consumers' premiums. 
Note 2: Moral Hazard 
There are two kinds of moral hazard, in the sense of Pauly (1968), that could be 
relevant to the problem of premium risk. On the one hand, consumers with insurance 
may purchase care that is valued below marginal cost, since they do not bear the full 
expense.
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If consumers are more likely to engage in this "consumption moral hazard" 
when they have a chronic condition, the difference between "unhealthy" and "healthy" 
premiums, m1 - mo , may be excessive. The informational content of premium 
differentials is distorted. There is also a risk of "behavior moral hazard:" consumers may 
be less likely to undertake costly behavioral changes that could reduce their risk of 
illness, such as changes in diet or exercise, knowing their premiums will not increase if 
they acquire a chronic condition. Reducing either form of moral hazard would require 




35 De Meza (1983) points out that increased consumption of health care by insured consumers can result 
from income effects, rather than moral hazard, and is not necessarily inefficient. 
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PRJ with coinsurance or only a partial public subsidy. It is also worth noting that the 
government will have an incentive under the subsidy system to invest in programs that 
reduce long-term healthcare expenditures; in contrast, Cochrane's premium risk 
insurance providers would have no such incentive: they are not necessarily responsible 
for paying future benefits to current clients. 
Note 3: Ex Ante Heterogeneity 
In my model, the only ex ante heterogeneity appears in (D), where consumers can 
have different costs of switching employers. Including this heterogeneity and no other is 
an arbitrary decision; surely consumers differ on all of the dimensions in the model. 
They may have different attitudes toward risk (differently shaped utility functions), 
different wealth and income, different discount factors, and so on. In (B), consumer 
heterogeneity may result in only partial uptake of PRJ if some consumers have 
particularly high discount rates. The potential for adverse selection in (C) is essentially 
the same as in (D): had I allowed for consumers with different degrees of risk aversion in 
(C), we would have had the "gradual" selection outcome of (D), rather than an all-or-
none choice. Only some consumers would have self-insured, and community-rated 
insurance would become less and less attractive the more healthy consumers left the pool. 
The subsidies in (E) would still be preferred by all consumers as long as we retained the 
assumption of risk aversion. 
A more damaging kind of heterogeneity for PRI would be if consumers differed 
in their ex ante probability of illness, p, or in the cost shocks they faced in different 
states of the world, 8 and f-L. If consumers and insurers had the same information about 
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these variables, future premium risk would still be insurable. The actuarially fair 
premium charged for PRJ would differ depending on the underlying risk. Only the 
uncertain part of costs could be insured. For example, if some people already had a 
chronic condition at the beginning of period 1, PRI would do nothing for them. The 
problem is more severe if information is asymmetric. Consumers would be subject to 
Rothschild and Stiglitz's (1976) adverse selection, perhaps resulting in a separating 
equilibrium or, in the extreme case, Akerlofs (1970) lemons market, where only high-
cost consumers purchase PRJ. The subsidy program could still be implemented in either 
case. However, with this kind of ex ante heterogeneity, subsidies take on a slightly 
different character, and may not be preferred by all consumers. If subsidies were used to 
equalize premiums, consumers who knew themselves to be healthier than average when 
the program began-ignoring possible externalities-would have no incentive to 
subsidize the premiums of consumers who started out unhealthy. Previously, all of the 
premium risk was in the future, and all consumers agreed to the subsidy because of the 
chance that they themselves would benefit. In this case, healthy consumers know they 
will benefit less than average, and the benefit may not be worth the cost. The subsidy 
program is essentially community-rated PRJ, except that consumers can be forced to 
participate. 
Note 4: Additional Periods 
Adding more periods to the model may mitigate the selection problems in (C) and 
(D). In (B), multiple periods would require PKH's sequence of premiums that decline 
over time as more information is revealed. Premiums remain "actuarially fair" with 
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respect to future risk. With positive costs of switching, between plans in (C) and 
employers in (D), additional periods could encourage consumers to remain in their 
current insurance pool even as they are revealed to be healthy. For example, a large-firm 
employee who did not acquire a chronic condition before period 2 would be more likely 
to switch to the individual market if that were the final period than if there were still a 
chance that she could acquire a chronic condition in periods 3 and beyond. She could 
switch to the individual market, and then switch back if she becomes chronically ill, but 
that would require incurring switching costs twice. 
Note 5: Administrative Costs 
Including administrative costs would affect several of the scenarios. In (B), if 
administrative costs are a fixed amount, for example selling costs per policy, they make it 
less likely that consumers will purchase PRI. If administrative costs vary with the 
amount of coverage, for example capital costs that are a percentage of claims, consumers 
will generally prefer PRI with a deductible.36 A variable loading charge acts as a tax on 
the insurance coverage, and consumers are better off bearing some premium risk 
themselves. The optimal subsidy of (E) will be similarly reduced if administrative costs 
are proportional to the size of the transfer. 
Administrative costs are generally much higher in the small-group and individual 
markets-normally accounting for 30-40% of the total premium-than they are for large-
group pools. This is mostly due to higher costs of selling policies and of determining 
consumers' relative risks?7 In (C), community rating could lower the expenses of 
36 See Arrow (1963). 
37 See Pauly and Nichols (2002). 
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"medical underwriting," making individual insurance more attractive, and reducing 
incentives for healthy consumers to self-insure (relative to the scenario outlined in the 
model). In (D), higher administrative costs in the individual market make it less likely 
healthy consumers will leave large firms, and more likely unhealthy consumers will join 
them. This brings us closer to the "(partial) pooling equilibrium," S) = 1 and S2 = 0 , 
which is the best we can do with this policy. 
Note 6: Income as a Function of Health 
Earning potential is probably reduced by the presence of a chronic condition: 
unhealthy consumers may be less productive, they may miss work because of illness or to 
visit a doctor, and they may face employer discrimination. In my model, it is easy to see 
that a reduction in an unhealthy consumer's period-2 income would be the same as an 
increase in m) . Since the optimal tax transfer of (E) equalizes wealth across states of the 
world, any decrease in income resulting from a chronic condition should be fully 
compensated. Such compensation may not be desirable if lost earning potential is 
unobservable, or if the transfer mechanism would distort incentives, for example by 
discouraging individuals from working. Because of the existence of Medicaid, the 
government program that insures low-income Americans, there is a possibility that 
having income vary with health status would result in a selection of unhealthy consumers 
into Medicaid, mitigating premium risk in private insurance markets. 
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Note 7: Community Rating and Large-Firms 
Current policy toward premium risk, and the kind of policy most commonly 
advocated by (non-economist) commentators on the topic, is some combination of rate 
bands in the individual market and anti-discrimination laws in the group market. 
Combining (C) and (D) will not discourage healthy consumers in the individual market 
from self-insuring. It may mitigate the adverse selection problem of (D). In particular, if 
both groups start period 2 with the same proportion of unhealthy consumers, there will be 
no incentive for anyone to switch employers in the first place. The single premium in the 
large firm will be the same as the community-rated premium in the individual market. 
However, this could be an unstable equilibrium. Healthy consumers can still choose to 
become self-employed and self-insured. If they stop purchasing insurance altogether the 
societal outcome will be even worse than the worst possible switching outcome in (D), 
S 2 = I , which is the complete "separating equilibrium." In this case, unhealthy 
consumers are left paying risk-rated actuarially fair premiums in both the individual and 
group market, while healthy consumers bear their full period-2 cost risk &, in addition to 
incurring switching costs. Alternatively, differences in the initial risk profile of each 
group could lead to higher premiums in one or the other and potentially costly switching 
by both healthy and unhealthy consumers into the lower-cost pool until premiums 
equalized. 
Since a large-scale move to self-insurance appears unlikely, a combination of 
policies (C) and (D) can seem like an attractive option. There are many other reasons 
why a government subsidy would be a superior policy. Rating restrictions are usually 





some states impose no restrictions at all. Without PRJ, people in low-restriction states 




selection across states (healthier consumers move to low-restriction states, unhealthy 
consumers do the opposite). Even if national rate bands were adopted, there are 




The purpose of rate bands is to force insurers to sell policies to high-cost clients at 
an expected loss, which creates a strong incentive for insurers to target their marketing 
I 
efforts toward healthier consumers, and do everything they can to avoid taking on 
I unhealthy clients. There may be relevant social-equality considerations since low-
I income and several minority groups tend to have more chronic conditions. There will 
I 
I 
also be an incentive for insurers to risk-rate by varying the level and type of coverage 
offered to different clients. Preventing this would require costly mandated-benefits 
legislation. Almost all observers agree that some rate variability is required for insurance 
markets to survive; in particular, some geographic areas have particularly expensive or 
inexpensive medical care, and elderly consumers generally require more care regardl~ss 
of health status. Since both geographic region and age can be correlated with the 
presence of chronic conditions, it is difficult, if not impossible, for government agents to 
distinguish between allowable and inappropriate premium differentials. Finally, this line 
of regulation reduces competition and product differentiation, which may encourage all 
insurers to skimp on quality, while inhibiting innovation. Imagine what any other 
product market would look like if the government legislated the product's price and all of 
its features. These problems are entirely avoided with the proposed subsidy program. A 
similar argument applies to proposals for a system of "universal healthcare." 
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Note 8: Premium Risk Insurance and Other Policies 
In scenarios (C), (D), and (E) above I implicitly assume that there is no private 
PRI available. In (C), PRI would be illegal since it would require insurers to charge 
differential premiums in period 2 depending on whether a consumer purchased PRI in 
period 1. In (D), large-firm employees could be forced to pre-pay premiums in period 
1.38 Consumers could still game the system by being self-employed in period I and 
joining large firms in period 2 if they ended up unhealthy, receiving PRI benefits without 
having paid for them. In (E), consumers will have no incentive to purchase PRI since 
they already receive it from the government. 
Note 9: Government Inefficiency 
The government subsidy system has the same potential drawbacks as most public 
programs. There is no opt-out mechanism. Since administrative costs prevent the 
government PRI from being offered at its actuarially fair value, consumers who are 
nearly risk-neutral may prefer to bear their own premium risk. Consumers who know 
themselves to be particularly healthy ex ante may not be willing to subsidize premiums of 
less fortunate compatriots. Ideally, the subsidy system should be financed with a fixed 
per-capita tax levy. This may be politically unpalatable, and alternative financing 
mechanisms like increased income taxes may be distortionary. A public program could 
be more administratively inefficient than market-based PRI would be, and it may 
permanently prevent such PRI from arising. The public system could be subject to fraud, 
and it may be difficult or costly to determine who should receive what level of benefits 
(although the same problem exists with market-based PRI). Insurers would need to be 
38 See Pauly, Nickel, Kunreuther (1998). 
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paid lump-sum, health-status-contingent benefits to prevent distorted incentives at the 
margin, similar to Medicare's "diagnosis-related groups" (DRG) system. The 
government would have to be careful to curb insurers' incentives to exaggerate 
diagnoses. Finally, a "slippery slope" may be a concern if the government extends its 





The current approach of public policy toward premium risk is misguided. It 
I emphasizes premium restrictions in the individual insurance market and anti-




protection against premium risk. At worst, distorted incentives result in selection and 
welfare losses. Private premium risk insurance, despite its potential benefits, has so far 
I 
failed to appear. This may result from moral hazard, adverse selection, medical inflation 
I risk, lock-in problems, or the uncertainty of future regulation. There may be a lack of 
I demand for PRl because of excessive consumer discounting or a cognitive bias that 
I makes healthy consumers underestimate their chances of acquiring a chronic condition. 
The existence of alternative regulations may further limit the appeal of private PRl. Even 
if it existed, PRI could do nothing for consumers who already have chronic conditions, or 
who are congenitally predisposed to them. Subsidy programs implemented thus far have 
been incomplete. They have suffered from under-funding, adverse selection, and 
eligibility rules that limit their effectiveness and obscure their purpose. The optimal 
subsidy program should be viewed as government-provided premium risk insurance: a 




position to fill the gap. Premium risk should continue to be an issue of highest priority in 
reforming the U.S. health insurance market. The most appropriate intervention would be 
to correct the specific market failure, while avoiding new distortions. 
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Appendix 
What follows is a proof of the inequality in (23). An analogous proof applies to (24). 
Using a second-order Taylor series expansion, we find that: 
make the substitution liJ = (x -!f-x J uw[w _ NL x] > o. Therefore, 
2 1 L 
U[ Wj - :L x ]-U[W1 -x]= (X- :L x )uf WI - :L x ]+m. Substituting this into (23) results in: 
which is true. 
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Utility 







For simplicity, the following graphs are shown for the case where there are only two possible 
revelations of one-period health states: perfect health and illness. The curve is a concave utility-
of-wealth function. Both healthy and unhealthy consumers can be in perfect health, in which 
case they have wealth w. The lines marked "healthy" and ''unhealthy'' connect the utility 
function at w with its level at wealth in the "illness" states of the world. Illness events are more 
costly for unhealthy consumers, and they occur with higher probability. The unmarked dots are 
a distance from w along their respective lines equal to the probability of illness for each type of 
consumer. Both types of consumer purchase insurance after their health state is revealed. The 
expected loss for healthy consumers is mo' and they end up at point A. For unhealthy 
consumers, the expected loss is m l , and they end up at point B. Ex ante expected utility is 
denoted by C. The "premium risk" has an actuarially fair value of p(mj-mo), where p is the 
probability a consumer will be "unhealthy." 
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Figure 2: Premium Risk Insurance 
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Expected utility in the "Do Nothing" scenario, where premium risk insurance (PRJ) is not 
available, is denoted by A. With PRl, consumers pay a guaranteed premium ofmO+p(m1-mO) 
regardless of health status, which results in expected utility at B. Because all premium risk has 
been eliminated, consumers are better off with PRl, ignoring discounting considerations. 
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Figure 3: Community Rating 
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U 1 > U 2' separating 
Wealth 
If community rating is enforced, healthy consumers are left with a choice: go uninsured and bear 
their full one-period cost risk (point A, utility level U I)' or subsidize the premiums of unhealthy 
consumers (point B, utility level U2). IfU1>U2, there will be a full separating equilibrium, with 
healthy consumers at A and unhealthy consumers at C. Unhealthy consumers are no better off than 
they would have been without community rating, and healthy consumers are worse off. 
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